Costco and Kroger both turned in strong results, in aggregate, relative to expectations. Obviously, Costco has faster growth given its deep value positioning and affluent customer mix. For the fiscal periods, Costco grew its US grocery business by roughly +$10B (annualized) vs. Kroger’s growth of $1.4B. Incoming Kroger CEO Greg Foran offered an early take on where he wants to take Kroger – move faster, systemize consistency in experience and enhanced product quality / freshness, and more price investment.

Grocery Outlet reported another quarter of below plan sales, that along with a soft 2026 YTD trend and a review of new store performance (classes from ’22 – ’25) has lead management and the Board to conclude that the most favorable outcome is to close 36 locations (especially in Maryland and Pennsylvania), as well as to evaluate selling its recently acquired United Grocery Outlet chain. Overall comp-sales have been pressured by fewer items in the basket (UPT) as shoppers are not finding the WOW!

As the re-Tarjay-fication of Target is just underway, top-line results for FQ4 were expected to be soft, and they were. The sales mix was also little changed. However, profit margins were favorable. The January trends improved despite the adverse weather at the end of the month. Shopping increased +2% for the month and visit frequency has stabilized. Both measures suggest early success with Target’s re-merchandising. Management noted that comps in Feb > Jan > Dec > Nov – just as observed traffic shows.

United Parks & Resorts (SeaWorld, Busch Gardens, etc.) reported roughly flat underlying domestic attendance for the smaller CQ4 period, and a decline in international attendance (similar to other operators). Domestic attendance was supported by discounting and other inducements. That and the decline in international attendance resulted in a -20% decline in EBITDA. Despite a lot of new competitive pressure in Orlando, SeaWorld was able to keep the time spent by domestic visitors for Q4 at roughly flat YoY.

Marmaxx produced a strong +5% comp-sales increase and HomeGoods a stronger +6%. For Marmaxx (TJ Maxx and Marshalls), the commentary and comp composition suggest that its merchants were able to source something extra special in terms of “best” brands. This would be from Neiman / Saks’ high-end vendors that had to redirect orders elsewhere given Neiman / Saks’ inability to pay for them. We now suspect that this “extra special” sourcing or “boost of luxury” also drove FQ3 and Ross’ results.

Download deck

Walmart again reported strong results for Walmart US and Sam’s Club, with the business model rapidly changing with fast delivery / upgraded merchandise offerings attracting more affluent households and that / retail evolution producing a large profit pool of alternative revenue streams (advertising, etc.) that allows Walmart to lean into EDLP, and drive more separation from incumbent retail. FQ4 contained a lot of external noise, hurricane comps, government shutdown, a more choiceful lower-end consumer, and yet, Walmart delivered +4.

The 8th issue of The Advan Buysider is now available. As a reminder, The Buysider is designed to provide timely, novel, and impactful insights on specific names and topics using Advan’s data. I welcome your feedback. Should you not see names / sectors that are of high interest today, reach out to me. The takeaways from #8: 1) You’ll have noticed that we’ve begun to update on names (some previews, some post-views) between full issues.

Download deck

O’Reilly Auto reported sales trends largely consistent with Q3 trends. Its market share capture in Commercial was again very strong. The DIY side of the business is still soft, reflecting that consumer. That said, vehicles need to be repaired when they break down, and so the volume decline in DIY is reasonably benign. Competition appears rational, given O’Reilly’s strong gross margin performance and despite O’Reilly moving into new East Coast markets; they win durable market share by out-serving the competition.